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THE SEC AT 70: TIME FOR RETIREMENT?
A. C. Pritchard*
INTRODUCTION
As one grows older, birthdays gradually shift from being
celebratory events to more reflective occasions. One's fortieth birth-
day is commemorated rather differently from one's twenty-first, which
is, in turn, celebrated quite differently from one's first. After a certain
point, the individual birthdays become less important and it is the
milestone years to which we pay particular attention. Sadly, for enti-
ties like the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), it is only the
milestone years (the ones ending in five or zero, for some reason) that
draw any attention at all. No one held a conference to celebrate the
SEC's sixty-seventh anniversary. Clearly the SEC is not getting its fair
share of chocolate cake.
Eventually, the birthdays come to be recognitions of the fact that
you are still around. Survival, not moving ahead in life, becomes the
notable fact. And so it is with the SEC. It has now been seventy years
since Congress created the SEC in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.1 We are still short of the gold standard for human survival-100
years-but seventy is not bad. The SEC today looks poised to outlast
even the longest human life span. It has largely moved beyond the
tasks that dominated much of its early agenda-the taming of the
New York Stock Exchange, the reform of corporate bankruptcies and
public utilities-and ensconced itself firmly as the arbiter of corporate
disclosure and the primary enforcer of antifraud rules relating to the
* Professor, University of Michigan Law School. This paper was prepared for
"The SEC at 70" symposium at the Notre Dame Law School, and I am grateful to
participants at that conference, as well as at a Fawley Lunch at the University of
Michigan, for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. Remaining
mistakes and outrageous statements are my responsibility alone. The Cook Fund of
the University of Michigan Law School provided generous support for the research
and writing of this article.
1 Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78mm (2000).
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purchase and sale of securities. 2 And the perceived importance of
those latter-day functions, and thus the SEC's prospects for survival,
have only increased of late, reinforced by the fin de si~cle accounting
scandals and corporate abuses. The list is by now familiar-Enron,
Worldcom, Tyco, Adelphia, Global Crossing, etc.-and the drumbeat
of scandal has made the SEC once again the fair-haired boy of the
Congress and the White House. The SEC was given a raft of new en-
forcement tools by Congress in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act3 as politicians
fell over themselves to get tough on corporate crime in the wake of
the collapse of the tech bubble. The SEC-most anxious not to disap-
point-has responded to this groundswell of support with a flurry of
rulemaking aimed at accountants, analysts and audit committees, just
to cover the "A"s.4 I have not run across any rules directed toward the
"Z"s, but I am sure that is only because the agency has not gotten that
far yet. So the SEC clearly shows no interest in slowing down and
taking it easy as it reaches its advanced years. A more telling sign of
continued vitality at the SEC is that the customary complaints about
how the agency does not have nearly enough resources to adequately
do its job of protecting the integrity of our financial markets5 have
given way to an extraordinary situation in which the agency finds itself
unable to spend all of the money allocated to it by Congress (which
was in turn, more than the White House asked for).6 This is a most
unusual problem for a bureaucracy to have. In sum, business is boom-
ing at the SEC.
2 The story is told in JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A
HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FI-
NANCE (3d ed. 2003).
3 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11,
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
4 Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 8220, Exchange Act Release No. 47,654, Investment Company Act of 1940
Release No. 26,001, 68 Fed. Reg. 18,787 (Apr. 16, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 228, 229, 240, 249, 274) (regarding audit committees); Regulation Analyst Certifi-
cation, Securities Act Release No. 8193, Exchange Act Release No. 47,384, 68 Fed.
Reg. 9481 (Feb. 27, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (regarding analysts);
Retention of Records Relevant to Audits and Reviews, Securities Act Release No. 8180,
Exchange Act Release No. 47,241, Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No.
25,911, 68 Fed. Reg. 4861 (Jan. 30, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 210) (regard-
ing accountants).
5 See, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 631 ("Neither the Clinton Administration
nor Congress gave the SEC adequate new budgetary or staff support during Levitt's
Chairmanship.").
6 Abigail Rayner, SEC to Get 20% Boost to Budget, TIMES (London),Jan. 4, 2003, at
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How odd then, the suggestion of my title that it might be time for
the SEC's retirement. Retirement can be made mandatory for per-
sons in "high policymaking position [s]" 7 after the age of sixty-five, and
the SEC certainly qualifies as a policymaker. But no one is pushing
the SEC toward retirement. Well, almost no one-I am not the first to
suggest that the time has come to put the SEC out to pasture. Jon
Macey suggested ten years ago at a commemoration of the bureau's
sixtieth anniversary that the SEC had become "obsolete" and that it
was time to kill it off.8 The efficiency of the financial markets, Macey
argued, has increased "as technology has developed and as market
professionals who compete to find mispriced securities have emerged
in huge numbers."9 Moreover, "the opportunities for manipulation
and fraud are probably fewer now than at any time in history" and
"rules against fraud existed long before there was an SEC." 10 Finally,
the development of portfolio theory and capital asset pricing models
had eliminated diversifiable risks from the investment process. 1 Ma-
cey's conclusion: "[M]arket forces and exogenous technological
changes ... have obviated any public interest justification for the SEC
that may have existed."12
Macey's argument was a non-starter then. The conventional wis-
dom held that "[t]he SEC is one important reason why the securities
industry is in so much better shape than other financial service indus-
tries, and why U.S. securities markets are the best securities markets in
the world."'13 The causal connection between the existence of the
SEC and the strength of the U.S. capital markets was difficult to
pinpoint, but the conventional wisdom did not question that it did
exist. And that conventional wisdom concerning the essential role of
the SEC in protecting the integrity of the financial markets has only
been strengthened by the aforementioned accounting scandals, al-
though the certainty that the U.S. markets are the best in the world
may have been shaken a bit.
Am I simply tilting at the same windmills as Macey? I think not.
Whereas Macey seemed intent on affirmatively killing off the SEC and
its essential functions, my proposal is (I think) considerably more
7 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2000).
8 Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Forma-
tion: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 909, 921 (1994).
9 Id. at 927.
10 Id. at 928.
11 Id. at 936.
12 Id. at 949.
13 David L. Ratner, The SEC at Sixty: A Reply to Professor Macey, 16 CARozo L. REv.
1765, 1779 (1995).
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modest. To return to the metaphor of my title, I think retirement
would suffice; capital punishment of the kind proposed by Macey is a
bit extreme. By retirement, I mean the abolition of the SEC and the
transfer of its essential functions to the executive branch. Specifically,
I propose transferring the SEC's regulatory function to the Treasury
Department and its enforcement function to the Justice Department,
while leaving largely intact the enforcement functions of the state se-
curities authorities and the self-regulatory organizations such as the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Public Company Accounting Over-
sight Board (PCAOB).
Old wine in new wineskins? Again, I think not. Separating the
SEC's regulatory function from its enforcement function promises to
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of both. My main point goes
to accountability. Although it is traditionally argued that placing ad-
ministrative responsibilities within the executive branch rather than
an independent agency is desirable because it increases accountabil-
ity, I think that the shift of authority I propose might diminish account-
ability, at least of a certain sort. The accountability that I believe
should be diminished is the SEC's accountability to Congress. Be-
cause the SEC is an "independent" agency, the President's influence
over the agency is limited to the ability to nominate commissioners,
and even that power is subject to the Senate's confirmation author-
ity.14 The SEC's status as an "independent" agency leaves it vulnerable
to the political whims of key legislators. 15 That vulnerability fuels the
cyclical pattern of neglect and hysterical overreaction that typifies se-
curities regulation emanating from both the SEC and Congress. 16
14 The President may have the power to remove commissioners, either under sec-
tion 4 of the Exchange Act or as a matter of inherent constitutional authority, but that
is a topic for another day. It suffices to observe that commissioners are practically
immune from removal because Congress would take a very dim view of any effort to
remove a sitting commissioner, and any attempt to do so would be met with signifi-
cant retaliation from the legislative branch.
15 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2271 n.93
(2001) ("As a practical matter, successful insulation of administration from the Presi-
dent-even if accomplished in the name of 'independence'-will tend to enhance
Congress's own authority over the insulated activities."); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 115 (1994) ("Con-
gress might make agencies independent not to create real independence, but in or-
der to diminish presidential authority over their operations precisely in the interest of
subjecting those agencies to the control of congressional committees. Independence,
in short, might be a way of increasing legislative power over agencies.").
16 See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997) (contending that major pieces of securities related
1076 [VOL. 8o:3
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Moving securities regulation to the executive branch might help insu-
late the field from this destructive pattern. In addition, congressional
oversight does little to help overcome the SEC's susceptibility to
groupthink and confirmation bias. Moreover, moving securities regu-
lation to the executive branch might open up the field to more di-
verse perspectives. More executive branch involvement might also
encourage securities regulators to move beyond their fixation with
promulgating new disclosure requirements. Finally, disrupting the
close connection between the SEC and Congress might disrupt-at
the margin-the disproportionate influence that interest groups exert
over securities regulation.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the pathologies of
the SEC and explores the relation between those pathologies and the
SEC's status as an independent agency. Part II then outlines an alter-
native regulatory structure primarily situated within the executive
branch. I also argue that such a relocation of authority would en-
hance regulatory effectiveness while simultaneously reducing the cost
of excessive regulation. The Article concludes with some thoughts
about the viability of my proposal.
I. THE PATHOLOGIES OF THE SEC
I should begin with a caution: I do not mean to overstate my case.
The SEC should certainly not be singled out as an underperformer
among regulatory agencies. It enjoys the reputation as being one of
the more competent of the administrative agencies and that reputa-
tion is, in my view, largely warranted. My point is a more modest one:
institutions matter in regulatory policy. In the field of securities regu-
lation, at least, the investing public is not well served by vesting au-
thority in an independent agency. I do not believe that securities
regulation in the United States has been a failure, but that does not
mean that we are incapable of doing better. I argue in Part II that we
might do better by placing the responsibility for the development of
securities regulation and the enforcement of those rules in the execu-
tive branch.
Where has the SEC fallen short? The list should be a familiar one
for most observers of securities law; I do not offer it as original. 17 Nor
is it intended to be comprehensive; others will have their own favorite
examples of SEC failure. My purpose here is merely to show that the
regulation came about following a large and sustained price collapse of the stock
market).
17 Indeed, many of the examples here are also offered in Stephen J. Choi & A.C.
Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (2003).
20051 1077
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SEC's interaction with Congress plays an important role in explaining
a range of familiar shortcomings.
A. Regulatory Overreaction
The single most powerful influence on regulatory policy is the
urge to protect defrauded investors in the wake of the bull market.
To be sure, some investors are defrauded as a bull market is climbing
ever higher, but the rising tide tends to obscure the shenanigans as
everyone focuses on the profits that they are piling up on paper. Con-
gressmen (at least some of them) recognize in the abstract that en-
couraging liquid securities markets will facilitate capital formation,
and thus, economic growth. Regulation may be necessary to secure
that liquidity. That interest, however, is not high on the list of legisla-
tive priorities during bull markets when investors' primary focus is
counting their gains and chasing the next "sure thing." During these
periods, Congress is happy to leave the day-to-day regulating to the
SEC, which is, after all, the expert agency.
Bear markets, however, inevitably follow bull markets. Corporate
mismanagement and corruption can be obscured by rising stock
prices in a bull market, but the dirty laundry has a way of surfacing in
bear markets. The bad news flushes out dissatisfied investors who
clamor for government intervention. Politicians who happily ignored
ever-climbing stock markets become profoundly interested in disclo-
sure policy when the financial news migrates from the business page
of the newspaper to the front page. The accounting scandal du jour
provides an opportunity to fulminate, hold a series of show trials
called "legislative hearings" to rake some greedy businessmen over the
coals and then enact legislation to protect "investor confidence." In-
deed, that is the genesis of the Exchange Act, which garnered much
of its legislative momentum from the legislative proceedings orches-
trated by Franklin Roosevelt's henchman, Ferdinand Pecora.18 The
recent spectacle of politicians falling all over themselves to outdo each
other in "getting tough on corporate crime" is only the latest chapter
of political overreaction to the fallout of corruption revealed by a bear
market. How quickly the winds shifted in Washington when Enron
and Worldcom collapsed under the weight of their "creative" account-
ing. Congress and the SEC, previously inert, have responded to pub-
lic outrage over corporate shenanigans by proposing a laundry list of
new laws and regulations to crack down on corporate abuses. For ex-
ample, after stymieing regulation of auditor independence during the
18 See Paul G. Mahoney, The Stock Pools and the Securities Exchange Act, 51 J. FIN.
ECON. 343 (1999).
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bull market, Congress quickly shifted course on the question with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, imposing an array of restrictions on services by
accounting firms to their auditor clients.' 9
There may be more than political opportunism at work here.
The availability heuristic is also in play, as both the SEC and Congress
focus too narrowly on recent and immediately available information.
Regulators may also be too quick to see a pattern in a series of events
that are in fact random.20 For example, a handful of salient account-
ing scandals may be construed as a corporate governance crisis. In
the face of a crisis, regulatory approaches seem to make sense when
they previously had no support whatsoever. Immediately prior to the
Enron scandal, CEO certification of financial statements was nowhere
to be found on the SEC list of policy initiatives. It was hardly news
that CEOs sometimes fudge the numbers, occasionally on a grand
scale.2 1 Nonetheless, CEO certification-like other aspects of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act-would not have been adopted without the exter-
nal pressure to react to a supposed crisis. Similarly, before the Enron
scandal broke, Capitol Hill had no interest in safeguarding the role
that analysts play as gatekeepers in the securities markets. After the
scandal, legislators were baying for regulatory reform, some of them-
perhaps-even sincerely. It seems unlikely that this shift on the part
of lawmakers could represent a rational response to new information.
More likely, it is a symptom of the availability heuristic at work. Also at
work is the hindsight bias, as SEC regulators and their congressional
overlords place too much weight on the probability of past events that
actually occurred relative to those that did not.2 2 Enron was "obvi-
19 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (g) (West Supp. 2004) (forbidding auditors from provid-
ing certain non-audit services to audit clients); id. § 78j-1 (j) (requiring the rotation of
audit partners); id. § 78j-1 (1) (prohibiting audit firms from auditing companies whose
CEOs, CFOs, or controllers were employed by the audit firm and participated in the
audit of the company during the prior year).
20 Cf Thomas Gilovich et al., The Hot Hand in Basketball: On the Misperception of
Random Sequences, 17 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 295 (1985) (contending that perceived "hot
hand" streaks of success are in fact random).
21 For an example of fraud prior to Enron, one need only look to Sunbeam Inc.
and former CEO "Chainsaw Al" Dunlap, who was removed as CEO in 1998 after alle-
gations of financial fraud. See Kelly Greene, Dunlap Agrees to Settle Suit over Sunbeam,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2002, at A3.
22 The hindsight bias describes the tendency to place too great a weight on events
that actually did occur in the past (rather than events that might have occurred but
did not) in predicting the probability of events. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight Is Not
Equal to Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 288 (1975) (discuss-
ing evidence of the hindsight bias).
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ously" a disaster waiting to happen-how odd that so few recognized it
before disaster struck.
And of course these biases interact in perverse ways with the
aforementioned political imperative to respond to the latest head-
lines. Opportunistic politicians may take advantage of the biases of
the electorate, playing up recent instances of fraud to gain electoral
support. Analyst independence only became a priority when the New
York state Attorney General revealed incriminating internal emails
from Merrill Lynch. 23 Only after Enron and WorldCom moved ac-
counting from the business page to the front page was auditor inde-
pendence a compelling need. The SEC did nothing to discourage the
notion that the small number of companies implicated in these scan-
dals reflected a broader pattern, a statistically very dubious proposi-
tion (following the "law" of small numbers).24 Notwithstanding this
dubious empirical foundation, once this story took hold alternative
explanations were pushed aside.25  Just as curious as the
(over)reaction to the "analyst affair" was the lack of reform effort
prior to the scandal. The airing of the investment banks' dirty laun-
dry provided no new information on the conflicts of interest that
plague that business model. The SEC-and indeed, most investors-
have long known that analyst ratings are skewed toward optimism and
that auditors often provide non-auditing services to their clients. 26
Worse yet, some of the abuses that Congress has lately seen fit to
regulate can be traced back not to a lack of regulation, but rather to
23 See Cheryl Winokur Munk, Merrill Changes Stock-Research Rating Process, WALL ST.
J., June 10, 2002, at C16.
24 People tend to give too little weight to large samples and too much weight to
small samples in drawing inferences on the characteristics of an overall population.
See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, inJUDG-
MENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY. HEURISTICS AND BIASES 23, 24 (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982) ("[P]eople view a sample randomly drawn from a population as highly
representative, that is, similar to the population in all essential characteristics. Conse-
quently, they expect any two samples drawn from a particular population to be more
similar to one another and to the population than sampling theory predicts .... ");
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 Sci. 1124, 1124-31 (1974).
25 See Clifford R. Mynatt et al., Information Relevance, Working Memory, and the Con-
sideration of Alternative, 46A Q.J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 759 (1993) (finding that sub-
jects who had developed a plausible hypothesis were less able to recognize
alternatives).
26 See Steven D. Jones, Heard in the Northwest: Region's Rare 'Sell' Ratings Apply to
Burgers, Machinery and a Thrift, WALL ST.J. Nw., Dec. 1, 1999, at 2 (noting that "of 833
opinions in place on the 135 stocks last week [of companies located in the Northwest
United States], there was a 'strong sell' on only one"), available at 1999 WL-WSJ
24923975.
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laxity in enforcement. During the bull market, Congress had more
important uses for the taxes generated from securities transactions
than policing the securities markets. An understaffed SEC long ago
gave up periodic review of company filings because it had other priori-
ties. Accounting fraud ranked low on the enforcement agenda, trail-
ing the vendetta against insider traders and the pursuit of teenagers
engaged in Internet stock scams. 27 Only in the late 1990s did the SEC
make financial reporting a priority. Once financials were put under
the microscope, the agency claimed to be shocked to find that chief
financial officers were playing fast and loose with the numbers. Once
the SEC started looking at the books, the number of restatements
skyrocketed and we had a deluge of restatements on our hands (at
least in the light of the particularly salient accounting scandals making
the front pages). 28
The "deluge" now seems to have abated somewhat, but the pas-
sage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been followed up by an orgy of
rulemaking that shows no signs of subsiding anytime soon. The SEC,
seeing a window of opportunity, looks for areas in which to expand its
sphere of influence while the public still worries over the specter of
massive fraud. The regulation of hedge funds looks to be the next
territory to conquer.29
Congress, however, shows certain signs of restlessness. As the
echoes of those accounting shenanigans begin to fade, various mem-
bers of Congress have been making threatening noises on the ques-
tion of the proper accounting treatment of options. Scandal driven
reform followed by political neglect has been a recurring pattern in
the securities markets. Although scandals may be needed to focus dis-
persed lawmakers' collective will, they often result in overreaction,
particularly if political entrepreneurs succeed in framing the issue in a
way that resonates with the electorate.
27 See Richard H. Walker & David M. Levine, "You've Got Jail:" Current Trends in
Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Internet Securities Fraud, 38 AM. CriM. L. REV. 405
(2001).
28 See Min Wu, Earnings Restatements: A Capital Market Perspective (2002), available at
http://www.revenuerecognition.com/article.cfm/3468384 (last visited Mar. 1, 2005).
29 See SEC Crime Spree, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2004, at A18.
It's hard to resist the conclusion that this entire hedge-fund exercise is little
more than empire-building by the SEC staff. Having missed the mutual fund
scandal, they know better than even Mr. Greenspan they have little ability to
ferret out hedge-fund fraud .... But with more oversight comes greater job
security and more Congressional cash.
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That dynamic means that demands for financial market regula-
tion will arise in times of crisis, particularly if that crisis spills over into
the real economy. Crisis, however, does not create the ideal environ-
ment for developing balanced, cost-effective policy interventions. Pol-
iticians will want to "do something," even if the proposed something
may prove to be costly, ineffective or counterproductive. SEC Com-
missioners and division heads will be called to the carpet by legislators
looking to hold someone accountable for the market decline. Com-
missioners and staffers tend not to enjoy such encounters. Not being
paid very well (relative to their alternative employment opportuni-
ties), they expect to at least lead a quiet life, which leads them to a
strong preference for conservatism in regulation. From the bureau-
crat's perspective, the optimal number of regulatory failures is zero. If
a rule makes an incremental contribution to the avoidance of a future
crisis, government regulators may be quick to see the rule's wisdom,
discounting its costs. Those costs will be borne by investors generally
in the form of small reductions in their investment returns and disclo-
sure documents that bury important information in a sea of minutia.
Those costs are sufficiently diffuse that they are unlikely to generate a
groundswell for regulatory reform. Thus, the cumulative effect of reg-
ulation in response to crisis is a ratchet effect pushing toward greater,
more intrusive regulation and greater deadweight costs for investors.
It may take multiple crises to push government regulations to the
point where they become a serious drag on the financial markets, but
having reached that point, it becomes very difficult to turn the ship of
state toward less regulation. Staffers at the SEC have more important
tasks to worry about than figuring out which regulations can be dis-
carded-when is the last time anyone at the SEC sat down looking for
items to cut from Regulation S-K? As the inflation rate creeps down
toward zero, do investors in today's environment really need a discus-
sion of the impact of inflation on a company's operations? 30
Worse yet, once in place, legislation and regulations often take
on lives of their own. It took Congress over six decades to get around
to repealing the Glass-Steagall Act, for example, enacted in response
to the crisis of the Great Depression.3 1 Legislators may accept the wis-
dom of prior legislation uncritically, operating under a confirmation
bias. 32 Interest groups that benefit from the regulatory apparatus will
30 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
31 See id. §§ 101-103, 113 Stat. at 1341-51 (repealing the Glass-Steagall Act, Pub.
L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933)).
32 See Joshua Klayman, Varieties of Confirmation Bias, 32 PSYCHOL. LEARNING & MO-
TIVATION 385 (1995) (describing different ways in which the confirmation bias can
io82 [VOL. 8o:3
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fight hard to preserve their prerogatives. Deregulation requires a
mammoth (and unusual) mustering of political will. Without any re-
cent information of equal salience-non-scandals tend not to gener-
ate newspaper headlines-no impetus will push for removal of
protective legislation.
One could argue that this regulatory approach makes sense-put
out fires and "don't fix what ain't broken." It may be costly to experi-
ment with new regulations (or less regulation) without the threat of a
perceived and immediate loss to investors. But this generalization
cannot always be true. Sometimes rationalizing regulation, such as
loosening up restrictions on forward-looking disclosure, may benefit
both issuers and investors. The continued bias toward reactive reform
to the securities laws represents a very dubious presumption in favor
of the status quo. That presumption can only be overcome, it seems,
by a spate of headlines. This political cycling between policies of be-
nign neglect and hysterical overreaction suggests that the SEC, far
from serving as a shelter against the vagaries of the political winds,
acts more like a weathervane, swinging wildly with the change in the
political atmosphere.
B. "Groupthink" and Confirmation Bias
I turn now from the SEC's susceptibility to external stimuli to its
internal thought processes. Few observers would suggest that there is
a great deal of diversity of thought at the SEC. The SEC is known for
its strong organizational culture. Often praised as hardworking and
dedicated, the mission of "investor protection" is taken to heart by
virtually all SEC staffers. As former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt put
it: "Investor protection is our legal mandate. Investor protection is
our moral responsibility. Investor protection is my top personal prior-
affect decisions). Once regulations are on the books, regulators may feel the need to
justify their worth instead of critically evaluating their effects. Evidence that does not
discredit regulation unambiguously will be ignored. See Donald Langevoort, Organ-
ized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and
Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101, 137 (1997) ("Ambiguous informa-
tion tends to be dismissed as unmanageable."). And the confirmation bias will be
more pronounced if the evidence is more complex and subject to conflicting infer-
ences, a fair characterization of most regulatory problems in the securities markets.
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 648 n.60 (1999) (collecting studies). Self-justifi-
cation is exacerbated when decisionmakers are held accountable in public settings.
Such self-justification can obstruct any change in the status quo. See Langevoort,
supra, at 142-43 ("[O]nce executives have committed to a course of action, their sub-
sequent survey of information is strongly biased to bolster their choice-especially
when their choice is public, and they can be held accountable for their decisions.").
2005] lO8 3
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ity."33 This ethos is no doubt reinforced by self-selection among those
seeking SEC employment. The people who pursue careers as regula-
tors and enforcement officials may be individuals with heightened
senses of justice and fairness. This is not entirely a bad thing. Such
traits may lead regulators to work hard for relatively low pay. Such a
culture helps maintain morale and focuses SEC staffers on the task of
regulating the capital markets.
Despite these benefits, the strong investor protection culture
within the SEC may also lead to "groupthink." Groupthink occurs
when individuals come to identify with the organization and accept its
mission uncritically due to their perceived membership in the
group.3 4 Although an individual may assess a particular decision criti-
cally, members of a group defer to the consensus. Groupthink will
also tend to reduce the range of hypotheses that an organization con-
siders when faced with a problem.3 5 Homogeneous groups like the
self-selected SEC staffers are particularly susceptible to the confirma-
tion bias36 and are perhaps more likely to engage in self-serving infer-
ences (to the extent that all the staffers have a homogeneous
interest).3v Once the SEC has committed to a policy initiative
through a rulemaking proposal-thereby tentatively committing the
"group"-feedback on the proposal may get less weight than it would
33 Arthur Levitt, A Question of Integrity: Promoting Investor Confidence by
Fighting Insider Trading, Remarks at the "S.E.C. Speaks" Conference (Feb. 27, 1998),
available at www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch2O2.txt.
34 IRVING L.JANIS, VICTIMs OF GROUPTINK (1972); see alsoJames D. Cox & Harry
L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of
Corporate Cohesion, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Summer 1985, at 83, 99-108 (applying
analysis to decisions by corporate boards); Robert J. Haft, Business Decisions by the New
Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1, 37-49 (1981) (same).
35 Chip Heath et al., Cognitive Repairs: How Organizational Practices Can Compensate
for Individual Shortcomings, 20 REs. ORG. BEHAV. 1, 20 (1998) ("Often, organizations
ensure that individuals weigh information effectively by forcing them to interact with
others who might weigh the information differently.").
36 See Stefan Schulz-Hardt et al., Biased Information Search in Group Decision Making,
78 J. PERSONALrIY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 655 (2000) (describing the tendency for like-
minded individuals to exacerbate the confirmation bias).
37 Donald Langevoort describes self-serving inferences as follows:
Self-serving inferences arise when there is a reasonably high level of ambigu-
ity surrounding a situation. With that kind of cognitive freedom, the mind
tends to form stronger-thanjustifiable inferences in the direction of a per-
son's self-interest. More simply, people see as correct what is more properly
described as convenient. Having rationalized their inferences, people feel
little guilt in acting upon them.
Donald C. Langevoort, When Lawyers and Law Firms Invest In Their Corporate Clients'
Stock, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 574 (2002).
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have if the information had been solicited before the SEC fixated
upon a specific proposal.
Groupthink may also manifest itself in the SEC's single-minded
focus on investor protection. When a decision can be placed on a nor-
mative scale, such as more or less investor protection, group decision
dynamics will push the group toward a polar end of the scale. At the
SEC, the systematic tendency will be to settle on outcomes that prom-
ise more investor protection. Many investors may be able to protect
themselves, but the SEC usually focuses on the stereotypical "widows
and orphans" in crafting protections. The SEC's recent initiative to
regulate hedge funds-the investment haven of the ultra-rich-
springs to mind.3 8 If hedge funds are not safe for widows and or-
phans, the SEC must bring them to heel. Only political pressure is
likely to deter the SEC from seeking the most restrictive alternative.
The SEC's focus on "widows and orphans" also helps explain its
consistently siding with the plaintiffs' bar. The plaintiffs' bar, of
course, styles itself as the "investor's advocate" even more strongly
than does the SEC. Private class action litigation has been an impor-
tant impetus toward ever more expansive interpretations of the anti-
fraud rules. With a few minor exceptions (sometimes driven by fear of
congressional retribution), the SEC has sided with the plaintiffs' bar
in the courts.39 As a somewhat exasperated Justice Powell noted, the
"SEC usually favors all 1. I can't recall a case in which this was not
so.
'
'40 The SEC has promoted this expansion despite the readily ap-
parent weaknesses in the arguments for investor compensation. 41
Congress is of two minds on this issue. Legislators are opposed to
"frivolous litigation," but they strongly favor compensating their con-
stituents for corporate fraud, even going so far as to give up some
money that would otherwise go the U.S. Treasury.42 Being of two
minds is the profit maximizing strategy for members of Congress, as it
allows them to extract contributions from the deep pockets on both
sides of the issue.
38 Registration Under the Adviser Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Invest-
ment Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,504 (Dec. 10, 2004).
39 See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, SEC Urges More Time for Bringing Fraud Suits, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 1, 2004, at Cl.
40 Justice Powell's comment is quoted in A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F Powell, Jr.,
and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 923 (2003).
41 See A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Securities Class Actions
with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REv. 925, 945-62 (1999) (discuss-
ing fraud on the market theory and class actions).
42 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7246 (West Supp. 2004) (codifying the Fair Funds for Inves-
tors provision).
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The SEC's single-minded focus on investor protection may also
fuel its aversion to clear rules. Regulated entities and their lawyers
vastly prefer determinate rules, which allow them to structure their
business dealings in predictable ways. The SEC, however, likes to af-
ford itself leeway, promulgating mind-numbingly detailed and corre-
spondingly impenetrable rules, but preserving discretion to pursue
those who would manipulate those rules for some deceptive pur-
pose.43 Too much clarity in the rules is deemed to provide a
"roadmap to fraud." And, of course, the SEC has a very expansive
notion of what constitutes fraud, one seldom bounded by common
law understandings of the term. Those regulated may find the outer
limits of the rules only when they are facing an enforcement action
and the SEC is demanding a settlement.44 Congress is responsible for
the broad rulemaking delegations that have facilitated this aversion to
clear rules, and it has done nothing to rein in the SEC's open-ended
interpretations of statutes.
Does congressional oversight ameliorate this tendency toward the
groupthink of "investor protection"? Not likely; instead, congres-
sional review tends to push the SEC to skew deliberation over rule
proposals to make those rules easier to justify to committee chairs and
their staffs. If rules are proposed to satisfy political demands, legisla-
tive oversight will induce greater justification for those rules, but it is
unlikely to generate more thoughtful consideration on the part of reg-
ulators. Because the SEC staff will be aware of the preferences of im-
portant members of congressional committees, the staff will tailor
regulatory rules to conform to those preferences.
The confirmation bias can be seen in the path dependence in the
SEC's regulations.45 As originally enacted in the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
the securities laws provided separate disclosure standards for compa-
nies making public offerings and those whose securities simply trade
on the secondary markets. For several decades thereafter, commenta-
43 See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional
Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 531 (1990).
Regulators have a natural bias toward the presence (or enhancement) of
complex regulation, rather than its absence (or reduction), a function of
institutional and personal self-esteem as well as economic self-interest....
One readily sees the legal mindset of the Commission's staff, for instance, in
many of the immensely arcane and open-ended rules that achieve a good
deal of technical elegance, if nothing else.
Id.
44 See generally ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA (1982).
45 See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 17, at 32.
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tors recognized the need to unify disclosure standards.46 Disclosures
have the same relevance to investors whether they are purchasing in a
public offering or on the secondary market. The SEC did not seri-
ously consider revamping the scheme until the 1960s, ultimately
adopting the present integrated disclosure system. 47 Even that, how-
ever, falls short of a full-fledged scheme of company disclosure. Con-
gress is nowhere to be found on this issue. Redundant disclosure is
imposing a small but steady drag on the economy, but there is no
political hay to be made in reducing that drag. And it certainly does
not rise to the level of a scandal.
C. Fixation with Disclosure
The SEC is not known for regulatory creativity, often attempting
to tackle difficult problems of corporate governance with measures
invariably derived from some variant of disclosure. Bribes being paid
to foreign government officials? Disclose them! CEOs being paid ob-
scene sums? Disclose it! Disclosure traditionally has been justified as
a means of exposing potentially problematic activities. Justice Louis
Brandeis's oft-quoted phrase that "sunlight ... is the best disinfectant"
provides a succinct summary of the philosophy behind disclosure. 48
Once investors (and others) can see such activities clearly, then mar-
ket participants are less likely to engage in opportunistic behavior in
the first place. Managers considering a self-dealing transaction, for
example, may choose not to do so if related-party transactions must be
disclosed. 49 In addition to ferreting out agency costs, disclosure may
assist rational investors in allocating their investment dollars, leading
to better use of capital and more accurate securities prices. So disclo-
sure has much to recommend it as a policy lever in securities
regulation.
46 The seminal article making the case for integrated securities disclosure is
Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1340 (1966).
47 See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383,
Exchange Act Release No. 18,524, Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 22,407,
Investment Company Act of 1940 Release No. 12,264, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (Mar. 16,
1982).
48 Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1913).
49 See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1047, 1050-51 (1995) (contending that mandatory disclosure works to
deter managers from engaging in opportunistic behavior at the expense of
shareholders).
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But disclosure is far from a panacea. Bounded search at the SEC
may blind regulators to possible alternatives to disclosure regulation. 50
In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, the SEC proposed
requiring corporate chief executive officers to certify corporate finan-
cial statements annually. Congress, anxious to be seen "doing some-
thing," followed this proposal with legislation enacting the CEO
certification requirement into law.51 What this added to the existing
disclosure received by investors is unclear, but the in terrorem threat
posed to CEOs and CFOs is quite clear. Huge sums are now being
devoted to ensuring that this "disclosure" is accurate. If it is not, the
executives fear, a flurry of lawsuits will follow, for which they face very
real exposure to personal liability (or, a more remote prospect, an
SEC enforcement action or, still more remote, criminal prosecution).
Simply having adequate disclosures is no longer enough; company ex-
ecutives need to disclose about disclosure. And the informational
value to investors of this certification has to be considered quite dubi-
ous.52 Given these difficulties with disclosure as a regulatory tool, the
SEC's continued reliance on disclosure suggests an unduly narrow
search within the SEC.
Disclosure is the tool of choice largely because that is what Con-
gress has given the SEC. The SEC's regulatory strategy reflects the
broad grants of authority to the agency to mandate corporate disclo-
sures under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Alternatives to disclosure gener-
ally would require the SEC to seek statutory authorization from
Congress. To get that authority, however, would almost certainly re-
quire the SEC to make an empirical showing to justify the need for a
new regulatory tool. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act provides the SEC with a
handful of additional tools, but disclosure remains the central theme.
Even though it relies on disclosure as the cure-all for the maladies of
securities markets, the SEC has done surprisingly little to investigate
the impact that disclosure has on those markets. 53 The agency instead
prefers to remain above the grubbiness of empirical data, preferring
50 See Heath et al., supra note 35, at 9-10 (discussing the tendency of individuals
to unduly constrict search for solutions to problems).
51 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a), 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241(a) (West Supp.
2004) (imposing "Corporate responsibility for financial reports"). The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act also requires a similar certification from corporate CFOs. See id. Both the
CEO and the CFO must attest to the appropriateness of the "financial statements and
[disclosures] in the report" and that those financial statements and disclosures "fairly
present in all material respects the financial condition ... of the issuer." Id.
52 See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 17, at 22-23.
53 Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 135, 173 (2003) ("[TIhe Commis-
sion has never studied investor behavior deeply enough to say, publicly at least, what
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to ground its policy prescriptions in "investor confidence." The SEC
avoids any meaningful definition of investor confidence, thereby
avoiding the possibility of empirical contradiction. But it also avoids
making a persuasive case to Congress for more creative tools to use
against corporate malfeasance. Congress is unlikely to be creative in
this arena on its own, given its generally reactive approach to securi-
ties regulation.
D. Regulatory Capture
Why do Congress and the SEC lay such heavy burdens on disclo-
sure as the regulatory workhorse? The answer to that question takes
us to our last shortcoming, regulatory capture. The SEC tirelessly pro-
motes the myth that individual investors can be successful in choosing
their own stocks, if only they devote sufficient energy to the volumi-
nous disclosures made available to them as a result of the wise regula-
tions promulgated by the SEC.54 Congress happily endorses the
populist notion that every Joe or Jane Investor can compete with the
big boys in picking stocks. Call it the myth of investor autonomy.
Moreover, well-informed shareholders will hold directors to account,
and those directors will in turn keep greedy managers in check. Call
this one the myth of investor sovereignty. The empirical evidence
contradicting both of these notions is overwhelming.
55
Why do Congress and the SEC perpetuate these myths? Because
the financial services industry requires these myths for its very exis-
tence. If investors were to switch en masse to index funds and other
forms of passive investment, the Wall Street-industrial complex would
crumble. The SEC would lose its reason for being. 56 And members of
Congress fortunate enough to serve on the Senate Banking Commit-
tee and the House Financial Services Committee would lose the steady
stream of contributions that help them maintain their tenure in of-
fice. So the myths of investor autonomy and investor sovereignty must
be maintained.
percentage of investors read or understand these documents, or what influence the
fundamental analysis-oriented disclosure has on their investment decisions.").
54 See generally Henry Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality,
78 TEX. L. REv. 777 (2000) (arguing that the SEC promotes the belief among ordi-
nary investors that a favorable return is virtually guaranteed).
55 See, e.g., BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET (rev. ed.
1999).
56 Langevoort, supra note 43, at 535 ("Securities regulation as we know it is built
on the very assumption of the presence of a large number of individual investors; a
wholly institutionalized market would mean far less meaningful a role (and substan-
tially less political power) for the SEC.").
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It would be a mistake to overstate the regulatory capture story.
Industry players fare well in the battle over the content of securities
regulation when they are enjoying the frothy rise of a bull market.
They are no match, however, for the populist appeal of protecting
defrauded small investors during a bear market, as discussed above.
Overall, there is little evidence to show that the SEC's status as an
independent agency has freed it from the influence of industry cap-
ture.57 As an agency with a specialized mission, it should come as no
surprise that the subjects of that regulatory attention have an interest
in influencing the agency. This would come as no surprise to the
Congress that created the SEC-enhancing the susceptibility of the
regulators to capture was an important goal behind the creation of
the SEC. Enforcement of the securities law was originally entrusted to
the Federal Trade Commission, which proved less vulnerable to the
influence of the securities industry than the broker-dealer community
desired. 58 The SEC was created as part of the '34 Act as a more indus-
try-specific regulator that would be more amenable to the financial
services industry.
Although that wish may have been frustrated in the short run, in
the long run the narrower focus of the SEC relative to the FTC has
made it more vulnerable to capture. The securities industry has spent
considerable lobbying resources to influence the appointment of
commissioners and, of even greater significance, chairmen. Moreo-
ver, the financial services industry has considerable influence over the
information that the SEC receives as it undertakes its rulemaking re-
sponsibilities. The result has been a system of securities regulation
that largely benefits the big players in the securities industry. The
SEC's protection of fixed commissions in the brokerage industry from
the debilitating effects of competition for nearly half a century is by
now a hackneyed example.59 And the SEC has dragged its heels in
implementing the National Market System that Congress intended to
replace the old cartel system. 60 The agency continues to struggle to
find a place for proprietary trading systems as the NYSE and Nasdaq
resist this incursion into their comfortable sinecures. It has also been
57 See, e.g., SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & RICHARD M. ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST (1981).
58 SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 95.
59 See Gregg A. Jarrell, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of Deregulation,
27J.L. & ECON. 273, 273-74 (1984).
60 See DALE ARTHUR OESTERLE, SECURITIES MARKETS REGULATION: TIME TO MOVE
TO A MARKET-BASED APPROACH 11-14 (Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 374, 2000);
Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of the National
Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 315-16.
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argued that other aspects of the SEC's regulatory agenda benefit pri-
marily the brokerage industry, including much of the detailed disclo-
sure required of public companies,61 as well as the contours of insider
trading law. 6
2
Industry influence has been reinforced by the narrow focus of the
relevant oversight committees in Congress: the Senate Banking Com-
mittee and the House Financial Services Committee. As Elena Kagan
explains, "[w]hen Congress acts in [the sphere of administration], it
does so through committees and subcommittees highly unrepresenta-
tive of the larger institution (let alone the nation) and significantly
associated with particularized interests." 63 As of the writing of this ar-
ticle, nine of the fifty-one members of the House subcommittee for
securities came from New York, New Jersey or Connecticut, and three
out of the fifteen members of the Senate subcommittee came from
these same three states. 64 This concentration of legislators from the
New York metropolitan area is evidence of the fact that "the one thing
the shadow executive system of the congressional standing commit-
tees can guarantee us is that the most affected regional interests will try to
kidnap the federal law execution processes that most affect them."' 65 The re-
maining legislators on these subcommittees, coming from states lack-
ing in constituents directly interested in this sector of the economy,
may be less acutely interested in the welfare of Wall Street. Nonethe-
less, service on one of these subcommittees is a cash cow for these
legislators, guaranteed to produce a steady stream of campaign contri-
butions. Wall Street makes huge investments in influencing the con-
tours of its regulatory environment.
66
61 PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 57, at 22-23 (arguing that the SEC's disclosure
policies favor market professionals).
62 David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest
Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30J.L. & ECON. 311, 312 (1987).
63 Kagan, supra note 15, at 2345-49.
64 House Comm. on Fin. Servs., House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance
and Government Sponsored Enterprises, at http://financialservices.house.gov/members.
asp? (last visited Nov. 20, 2004); Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., Urban Affairs,
Subcommittee on Securities and Investment, at http://banking.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuse
Action=information.Subcommittees (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
65 Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK.
L. REv. 23, 63 (1995).
66 This provides a powerful incentive for Congress to organize itself into commit-
tees. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice
Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1328, 1335 (1994) ("Interest groups can monitor the
behavior of a few committee members much more closely than they can track all
members of Congress. The small size of committees also permits the concentration of
rewards, whether campaign contributions or other forms of political support.").
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The financial services industry is not the only affected party that
gives special attention to these legislative oversight committees. The
accounting firms and the high-tech sector are also intensely inter-
ested. This influence was felt during the 1990s on the questions of
expensing stock options and auditor independence; the SEC backed
down in both cases in the face of congressional opposition.67 For ex-
ample, corporations poured millions of dollars into the campaign war
chests of strategically placed congressmen to head off the Financial
Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) efforts to require that options
grants be accounted for as an expense. Congress then bullied the sup-
posedly independent FASB into submission; the SEC aided and abet-
ted the effort. 68
The consequences of this interested oversight is that the SEC reg-
ulates in the shadow of potential retaliation from Congress. Legisla-
tors on the relevant committees have powerful tools to bring the
agency to heel. 69 If the agency strays too far from the dominant view
on those subcommittees, it risks legislative overruling and, worse yet,
budget cuts. The bottom line: "independent" agencies such as the
SEC are not independent of politics; they are highly dependent upon
the industries that they are charged with regulating. That depen-
dency is mediated through Congress, which uses its mediating role to
extract financial support from the financial services industry, account-
ing firms and public companies. Good work if you can get it.
II. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AS SECURITIES REGULATOR
In this Part, I argue that the transfer of the SEC's authority to the
executive branch might ameliorate some of the shortcomings identi-
fied in Part I. I begin by briefly outlining my proposal. I then turn to
why I think this shift in enforcement authority will address each of the
problems identified with the SEC's approach: regulatory overreaction,
groupthink and confirmation bias, fixation with disclosure, and regu-
latory capture. I make no claim that my proposal is a cure-all; I will be
satisfied if I persuade my readers that it would lead to a marginal
improvement.
My proposal is quite simple. The SEC's rulemaking authority
should be turned over to the Treasury Department, to be overseen by
67 SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 727.
68 Id. at 716.
69 See Kagan, supra note 15, at 2258 ("The legislative sanctions backing up the
system include new legislation, budget cuts, and embarrassing oversight hearings. If a
fire alarm goes off, the committee can threaten and, if necessary, use one of these
sanctions to bring the agency into submission.").
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the same regulators who oversee other aspects of financial regula-
tion.70 The SEC's enforcement authority should be turned over to the
Justice Department and combined with that agency's existing fraud
section. Civil and criminal enforcement would be consolidated within
the same department.
A few administrative details would need to be worked out. The
adjudications currently processed by the SEC's administrative law
judges (ALJs) could be turned over to ALJs located in Treasury, or
better still, be conducted in federal district court. The SEC's supervi-
sory authority over the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) would
also go to Treasury; SROs that failed to fulfill their enforcement obli-
gations could be referred to Justice. The SEC's power to review sanc-
tions imposed by the SROs could be handed over to the district
courts. The states could continue to play a role in enforcing the fed-
eral statutes and regulations devised by Treasury.
Note that I am not suggesting firing the SEC staff-the staff mem-
bers could be divvied up appropriately between the two departments
without creating undue confusion. Five commissioners, however,
would be looking for work. I address below the justifications for the
minor blip in unemployment caused by this sweeping transfer of regu-
latory authority.
A. Regulatory Overreaction
Could transferring regulatory authority to the executive branch
dampen the rapid swings from regulatory inertia to regulatory hyste-
ria? We have witnessed a series of largely garden-variety frauds over
the past few years. Companies were making up earnings. Analysts
were recommending stocks that they thought were crap. Mutual
funds were providing sweetheart deals to big investors in the form of
guaranteed profits through late trading. The response of the SEC and
Congress to the revelation that "There is fraud in our financial mar-
kets!" has been a deluge of new statutes and regulations. Those sub-
ject to all these new rules publicly welcome them and privately pass
70 My proposal obviously invites the question of why continue the plethora of
banking regulators that we currently have. That is a topic for another day to be ad-
dressed by someone who knows something about banking regulation.
My proposal also implicates the status of the Commodity Future Trading Com-
mission (CFTC). Also transferring the CFTC's rulemaking authority over financial
derivatives to the Treasury Department would finally bring an end to the jurisdic-
tional squabbles between the SEC and the CFTC (although not the sparring between
congressional committees that enjoy oversight over those agencies).
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the costs along to investors. 71 To be sure, some of the wrongdoers are
now facing enforcement actions and criminal prosecution. And the
companies, broker-dealers and mutual funds implicated in the sleaze
have taken a serious hit in the market, which enforces its judgments
much more swiftly and surely than the government ever could. But
sending the bad guys to jail and hammering the stock price of their
employers is never enough. We must punish the wrongdoers and
make sure this never happens again. 72 I have no quarrel with punish-
ing the wrongdoers, but I fear that the SEC and Congress will typically
be fighting the last war as they continually expand the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations and the United States Code in their quest to end
fraud. The fraudsters, I'm afraid, will always be with us.
Would transferring accountability from the SEC to the executive
branch help dampen the tendency to regulatory overreaction? Ac-
countability (or the lack thereof) favors the status quo in this context.
Although the President remains ultimately accountable for policy
choices affecting the securities markets in my model, the transfer of
authority envisioned in my proposal would divide accountability be-
tween the Departments of Treasury and Justice. Unlike the commis-
sioners of the SEC, who are responsible for both rulemaking and
enforcement, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General
would each exercise only a portion of the regulatory authority cur-
rently wielded by the SEC. Unlike the ultimate accountability borne
by the President, these political actors would be accountable only for
the regulatory authority within their respective jurisdictions. This
means that each will be able to point the finger at the other in the
event of regulatory "failure." Was the scandal of the week the result of
insufficiently stringent rules or a consequence of lax enforcement?
One does not ordinarily consider finger-pointing of this sort a
useful mechanism for encouraging effective regulation. 73 In this con-
text, however, separating enforcement and rulemaking allows for a
71 See, e.g., Paul Schott Stevens, Editorial, Honest Funds, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2004,
at A20 ("Our legal and regulatory system is working as designed, to identify and cor-
rect misconduct, to prevent it from recurring, and to hold investors harmless."). Ste-
vens is the President of the Investment Company Institute. Id.
72 See Brooke A. Masters & Ben White, SEC Wants Fixes, Not Fines, WASH. POST,
Sept. 29, 2004, at El ("Rather than assessing fines and rapping knuckles after abuse is
uncovered, the chairman [William Donaldson] wants the 3,800 person staff to work
with and get to know Wall Street well enough to get the jump on problems before
large numbers of investors lose money.").
73 See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 65, at 43.
[P]lurality in the executive defeats accountability not only because it be-
comes more costly to figure out who to blame when there exist two or more
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healthy bit of indirection and delay. The SEC has no one else to
blame when it is dragged before Congress-Congress has certainly
not been grudging in affording it rulemaking authority, even if it fre-
quently has been rather tightfisted with dollars for enforcement. But
Justice and Treasury could blame each other. "The rules prohibiting
this fraud are unclear, so we can't go after the bad guys," can be met
by, "This behavior clearly violates our anti-fraud rules. Prosecutors
should come down hard on these fraudsters." This is the sort of mu-
tual recrimination that Washington uses all the time to deflect calls
for change. It is sometimes disparagingly characterized as "gridlock,"
but it has an important stabilizing influence, unless one thinks that
every social ill calls out for a vigorous government response. The Pres-
ident would be accountable for the tradeoff between rulemaking and
enforcement. Congress is likely to think twice before it calls him
before a subcommittee for a lecturing on regulatory priorities and the
critical need to protect widows and orphans. Simply put, the Presi-
dent is too busy for that. By contrast, commissioners of the SEC, most
assuredly, are not.
If Congress wanted to make its influence felt, it would have to go
through the tedious and time-consuming process of drafting legisla-
tion, finding a majority coalition to vote for it and persuading the
President to sign the resulting bill into law. The marginal cost of this
effort is substantially greater than bullying the SEC. Perhaps Con-
gress, too, would then find better things to do.
B. "Groupthink" and Confirmation Bias
The Secretary of the Treasury has a lot of irons in the fire. Ac-
cording to the department's website, "[t]he mission of the Depart-
ment of the Treasury is to promote the conditions for prosperity and
stability in the United States and encourage prosperity and stability in
the rest of the world."74 That's a big job. More concretely, the Trea-
sury is responsible for:
Managing Federal finances;
Collecting taxes, duties and monies paid to and due to the U.S.
and paying all bills of the U.S.;
Producing postage stamps, currency and coinage;
Managing Government accounts and the public debt;
candidates for blame, but also because the two or more candidates may very
well conspire among themselves to create ambiguity about the locus of blame.
Id.
74 U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Duties and Functions, at http://www.treasury.gov/
education/duties (last visited Nov. 20, 2004).
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Supervising national banks and thrift institutions;
Advising on domestic and international financial, monetary, eco-
nomic, trade and tax policy;
Enforcing Federal finance and tax laws;
Investigating and prosecuting tax evaders, counterfeiters, and
forgers. 75
This diversity of tasks encourages a diversity of perspectives
among the top officials at the Treasury. Although all of the senior
staff are likely to have expertise in one or more of these areas, it is
unlikely that any one of these areas will predominate. Consequently,
when it comes time to decide important policy matters, the Secretary
will be getting advice from people with a broad range of backgrounds.
For the Secretary and the rest of the Treasury staff, it is hard to have a
single-minded focus on saving widows and orphans from the vipers of
Wall Street when you have so many tasks that require your attention.
Investor protection would continue to be an important goal for a
Treasury Department charged with regulating the securities markets,
but so would capital formation, diversification of the outlets for finan-
cial services to consumers, and cooperation with foreign regulators. 76
To be sure, many members of the Treasury staff will specialize in
the regulation of the securities markets under my proposal, but their
proposals will face the scrutiny of superiors not suffused in the culture
of investor protection. And promotion within the department is un-
likely to be a lockstep progression-a person who shows talent in the
field of banking or tax might be tapped for an important role in regu-
lating the securities markets. Going higher up the chain, Republicans
and Democrats would switch places in the politically appointed slots as
power shifted in the White House. The result would be less homoge-
neity, broader search and more critical thinking generally.
So too, with the Justice Department. The Attorney General has at
least as broad a range of concerns as the Secretary of the Treasury-
locking up terrorists, fighting the war on drugs, prosecuting environ-
mental polluters, etc. Going down to the trenches, the FBI special
agent who shows talent in making a case against Medicare fraudsters
may well have talent for unraveling the machinations of accounting
fraudsters. Fraud is fraud, and the expertise of the SEC staff can easily
be oversold. The Justice Department has many lawyers and investiga-
75 Id.
76 Cf Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SuP. CT. REv. 41, 78 ("Agencies
with highly specialized agendas will tend to focus solely on matters within their juris-
diction, thus often adopting regulatory policies with perverse consequences elsewhere
in the economy.").
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tors who are proficient at prosecuting securities fraud (e.g., the fraud
unit of the U.S. Attorney's office in the Southern District of New
York). There would be many more such professionals if the Justice
Department took over civil enforcement of the securities laws along
with the criminal authority that it already exercises. But expertise
must be balanced against diversity of perspective, and it is hard to
imagine any state of the world in which the SEC would surpass Justice
on diversity.
More importantly, the lawyers at Justice are more likely to view
the regulations promulgated by Treasury with a critical eye. Although
both departments are nominally components of the executive branch,
they have distinct histories and cultures. Lawyers at Justice are much
less likely to buy into the work of Treasury than SEC enforcement
attorneys are to buy into the work of the Divisions of Market Regula-
tion or Corporate Finance. The lawyers in the executive branch are
on the same side, but not the same team. Justice is unlikely to suffer
from confirmation bias in reviewing the proposals of Treasury; it is
not their work, after all. The division between the two departments
also matters for those discussions of enforcement policy in slightly
shabby conference rooms at Justice or the Treasury. Clear rules may
be a "roadmap to fraud," but it is much easier to show violations of
them in court. The skepticism with which the Solicitor General's of-
fice has treated some of the SEC's more cockamamie theories affords
a concrete example. 77
Lawyers at the Justice Department are also more likely to be skep-
tical of the need for class action litigation and investor compensation.
The SEC's support for the plaintiffs' bar helps the agency with the
more populist element in Congress, but the Justice Department knows
that deterrence (the specialty of prosecutors) is really the critical ele-
ment in minimizing the social costs of fraud. Fraudsters need to go to
jail and pay hefty fines; what happens to the money afterward is, at
best, a sideshow.
C. Fixation with Disclosure
Can a transfer of authority to the executive branch stimulate
more creative thinking about regulatory responses to malfeasance by
corporate officers and financial services professionals? Recall my ar-
gument that the Congress and the SEC focus almost exclusively on
disclosure because it reinforces the myths of investor autonomy and
77 See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 40, at 935 (discussing conflicting positions taken
by the United States and the SEC in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983)).
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sovereignty, a very lucrative myth as far as the financial services sector
is concerned.
Would Treasury and the President be equally enamored of this
myth of the empowered investor? To be sure, the financial services
industry is a major contributor to presidential as well as congressional
campaigns, so disclosure has continued appeal. But the lines of ac-
countability for ultimate policy choices would be clarified somewhat
with a transfer of authority to the executive branch. A risk averse Pres-
ident who wanted to avoid a political backlash from the next bull mar-
ket would strongly favor a well-diversified electorate. The real stories
of pain in a market decline are from the poor souls who are un-
derdiversified. Politicians, of course, are notoriously wary of blaming
even foolhardy victims for their plights (think of the Enron employ-
ees) despite the inexpensive self-help that they could have adopted.
"This all could have been avoided with a bit more disclosure!" Or a
bit of diversification. It is doubtful that a politician in the White
House would be willing to blame the victim any more than Congress
and the SEC. Policy will continue to focus on throwing the books at
the wrongdoers.
But will the President follow condemnation of the bad guys with a
slew of new disclosure requirements to address last year's fraud? The
President has the advantage of being able to rely on the strong rhetor-
ical message sent by actual criminal prosecutions. The SEC's civil en-
forcement powers look rather tame by comparison to hard time in a
federal prison. Congress has only the ability to write additional rules.
Congress can, of course, ratchet the jail time up another couple of
notches, but most maximum penalties in the securities area are al-
ready well past the point of diminishing marginal deterrence and,
worse yet, obviously so. No one is impressed anymore by another five
to ten potential years of jail time for white-collar criminals after the
first ten to twenty. Martha Stewart's six months in prison will be quite
sufficient to deter her from lying to the government in the future.
Neither Congress nor the SEC has the satisfying power of throwing
the fraudsters in jail. Used aggressively, the authority to prosecute
could satiate the public clamor to do something without imposing an
additional burden of disclosure costs on all the businesses that did not
break the law and should not be punished. This may not satisfy the
hue and cry for government intervention in extreme cases, but a few
well-placed "perp walks" can help deflect the demand for additional
disclosure requirements.
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D. Regulatoiy Capture
Would a transfer of authority to the executive branch make a sig-
nificant dent in the extent of regulatory capture? Of the four con-
cerns identified here, this one carries the least weight; it would be
insufficient standing alone to justify transferring regulatory authority
to the executive branch. The principal effect of such a transfer on the
usual pattern of "inside-the-Beltway" rent-seeking would be to simply
shift some of the power to extract rents from regulated industries.
Members of Congress would have a bit less, and the President would
have a bit more. The financial services industry already tries to curry
favor with the President in order to influence the choice of commis-
sioners and to be able to call upon the President's aid in the lawmak-
ing process (either to instigate or veto legislation). Giving the
President authority over rulemaking Would enhance the President's
attractiveness as recipient of lobbying largesse. By contrast, lobbying
to influence the Justice Department's enforcement agenda would be
very tricky business; not many White House staffers would enjoy wak-
ing up to read in the Washington Post about influence peddling related
to Justice Department fraud prosecutions.78 On balance, I think the
overall shift would be to make members of Congress less attractive and
the President more attractive, 79 but rent-seeking, like fraud, will always
be with us.
Despite these caveats, I think that my proposal would achieve
some limited success in diffusing the effect of lobbying expenditures.
Members of the House and Senate subcommittees for securities that
do not have a substantial number of constituents in the financial ser-
vices industry have little to constrain them from offering their votes
and influence to the highest interested bidder. The voters back home
in Wyoming will have little interest in their Representative's vote on
reforming the market structure for buying and selling securities. In
that vacuum of electoral interest, campaign contributions (which can
be used to pay for the television ads to reach all those voters spread so
thinly across the state) can be very persuasive indeed.
78 At least some members of Congress apparently feel no such compunction. See
SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 648 F.2d 118 (3d. Cir. 1981) (en banc) (per-
mitting discovery on the question of whether an SEC investigation was the result of
political pressure from a Senator).
79 This obviously would have little appeal for the average member of Congress,
suggesting that my proposal has limited prospects for legislative success. Realistically,
my proposal could only be put into action by a President with an exceptionally strong
mandate who was willing to use up some of his political capital on administrative
reform. I won't hold my breath on this one, but the situation is not hopeless. See infra
notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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The President, by contrast, has many constituencies to which he
must answer and is unlikely to be able to give decisive weight to any
one interest group. Simply put, it costs more to buy a President than a
legislator, even a well-placed one.80 Moreover, it is harder for lobby-
ists to gain access to the President, given the demands on his time. To
be sure, the White House staff and Treasury Department officials are
likely to be more responsive, but they too will have diverse constituen-
cies to which they need to attend on the President's behalf.81 Con-
gressional committee members will still have a role to play in
influencing policy, 82 but they carry substantially less of a threat in a
conflict with the executive branch than they do with the SEC.8 3 The
President, as a roughly coequal actor in the legislative and budgetary
processes, can fight back if a department's budget is threatened; the
SEC has to grin and take it.84 A transfer to the executive branch will
not eliminate concerns over regulatory capture, but it might slow
80 See Calabresi, supra note 65, at 64 n.105 ("National factions probably work to
acquire state and local congressional representation because the cost under our elec-
toral system of gaining congressional power is considerably less than the cost of win-
ning presidential power.").
81 Id. at 84 n.148 ("Congress can probably reduce the likelihood of capture by
creating larger cabinet departments with more generalized jurisdictions like the big
four: State; Treasury; Defense; and Justice. These four flagship departments have on
balance better historical reputations in part because they are harder to capture.").
82 Cf Geoffrey P. Miller, The Unitary Executive in a Unified Theory of Constitutional
Law: The Problem of Interpretation, 15 CARuozo L. REV. 201, 205 (1993) ("Congress no
doubt has substantial control over the ... executive branch, control that flows largely
from the fact that Congress need not create the powers in question in the first
instance.").
83 See Kagan, supra note 15, at 2347.
[W] hen the President has had little to do with agency action, the prospect
that he will provide strong support for the agency declines, and the likeli-
hood that the agency will succumb to congressional pressure correspond-
ingly increases. This logic explains empirical data indicating that Congress
can dictate more successfully to commissioners of independent agencies
than to secretaries of cabinet departments ....
Id.
84 See Easterbrook, supra note 66, at 1341.
A President may resist claims by factions in the way Madison envisioned: by
adding other items to the agenda. But agencies devoted to single industries
lack threats; they cannot promise to veto bill X if Congress takes step Y. Be-
cause agencies cannot engage in logrolling, committees in Congress gain
relative influence. The loser is the President (with a national constituency),
and the principal beneficiaries are committee chairmen, who hold, on aver-
age, beliefs farther from the national median view of politics.
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down by a step or two the interest groups attempting to capture regu-
latory policy.8 5
More importantly, the accountability for tailoring regulations to
suit interest groups would be clear. Under the current regime, Con-
gress can bully the SEC into caving in the face of interest group pres-
sure and no member of Congress will face any serious threat of
reprisal (as with Congress's derailing of expensing for options).
There is safety in numbers. If the President overrules rules proposed
by the Treasury staff, the responsibility will be clear.8 6 If new rules are
warranted, the President who nixes them would face a considerably
more substantial risk of political embarrassment than would an indi-
vidual Congressman. 87
CONCLUSION
As the SEC marks its seventieth anniversary, the survival of securi-
ties regulation, and the federal government's role in that regulation,
are no longer in doubt (if they ever were). Federal securities regula-
tion is here to stay; proposals to do away with it are unlikely to garner
much support anytime soon.
I have made a more modest proposal in this Article: transferring
that authority over securities regulation to the executive branch. The
main impetus behind my call for reform is that the SEC is "indepen-
dent" in name only.8 8 The agency's dependence on Congress has
some unfortunate consequences for the path of regulatory policy in
the field of securities. Specifically, far from dampening the boom and
bust cycle in securities regulation, the SEC-under the watchful eye of
Congress-has fueled the cyclical swings in regulatory policy as a
means of gaining additional authority and budgetary support. Con-
gress and the SEC have fed off each institution's cognitive biases.
Most destructively for investor welfare, both institutions have perpetu-
85 See Miller, supra note 82, at 201 ("Where the agency exercises a limited man-
date that is likely to be captured or heavily influenced by particular interest groups,
the argument for presidential oversight is strong.").
86 See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAw: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 153 (1991) ("The lines of responsibility should be stark and
clear, so that the exercise of power can be comprehensible, transparent to the gaze of
the citizen subject to it.").
87 Calabresi, supra note 65, at 47 ("Accountability, resulting from the creation of a
unitary executive, was seen as promoting faction control by making the executive
clearly responsible to and representative of the interests of the whole of his national,
electoral constituency.").
88 Cf id. at 84 ("Anything that weakens the presidential set of incentives and con-
trols strengthens Congress and vice versa. There is no such thing as a truly indepen-
dent agency in Washington, D.C.").
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ated the twin myths of investor autonomy and investor sovereignty.
Finally, vesting regulatory authority in the SEC has facilitated agency
capture and enhanced the ability of members of Congress to extract
rents from the securities industry, the accounting profession and
others affected by securities regulation.
I have argued that the executive branch might be somewhat less
subject to these maladies if we were to vest authority over securities
regulation in the Treasury and Justice Departments. I am far from
claiming that regulatory "perfection" (whatever that would mean)
would follow if my proposal were implemented. More modest im-
provements, however, might come about. Transferring authority
might dampen the regulatory overreaction that follows in the wake of
bear markets. The Treasury and Justice Departments would almost
certainly bring greater diversity of perspective to addressing the
problems of corporate governance and the securities markets. Those
departments might view more skeptically the claim that disclosure
solves everything. And my proposal might reduce the extent of
agency capture at the margin (but only at the margin).
Is my proposal to transfer regulatory authority over the securities
markets to the executive branch as far-fetched as Jonathan Macey's
call to end federal securities regulation altogether? It might appear so
at first blush. The SEC is busier than ever, better funded than ever
and has more support generally in Congress than it has enjoyed any
time in recent memory. Moreover, there are powerful constituencies
that have come to rely on the SEC for their professional livelihoods.
Corporate lawyers, for example, would strenuously resist the abolition
of the SEC. I am a natural-born pessimist, so I freely concede that my
proposal is unlikely to be adopted anytime soon.
The one constant in securities regulation is that the political for-
tunes of the SEC generally ebb and flow with the cycles of the market.
The correlation is inverse, however, so the SEC rides high when the
Dow Jones Industrial Average rides low. But within that broader cor-
relation there is some variance in the support for the SEC. When the
market is first hitting the downward trend in its cycle, support for the
SEC may dip along with the major indices as the agency takes its share
of the blame. In one of those future dips-who can predict when it
will come-may arise the opportunity for the sort of administrative
reform proposed here. To be sure, the relevant committees in Con-
gress will cling tenaciously to their "independent" agency, but some-
times the political imperative to "do something" can overcome even
entrenched institutional self-interest. It would be a poor bet to try
and handicap a retirement date for the SEC, but it might be almost as
speculative to count on the agency's staying on the job forever.
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